traffic on a best efforts basis, ostensibly to foreclose the potential for the Internet to fragment and balkanize into various types of superior access arrangements, available at a premium, and a public Internet increasingly prone to real or induced congestion. Opponents to compulsory network neutrality seek to differentiate service, in terms of quality, price and features to accommodate increasingly diverse user requirements. For example, on line game players, IPTV viewers and VoIP subscribers may need prioritization of their traffic streams 13 so that their bits arrive on time, even if this outcome requires the ISPs to identify and favor these traffic streams.
ISPs want the flexibility to offer different options for consumer access to the Internet and how content providers reach consumers. Consumer tiering could differentiate service in terms of bitrate speeds, amount of permissible traffic carried per month and how an ISP would handle specific types traffic, including "mission critical" content that might require special treatment, particularly when network congestion likely may occur. While consumer tiering addresses quality of service and price discrimination at the first and last kilometer, access tiering could differentiate how ISPs handle content upstream into the Internet cloud 14 that links content providers and end users. Network neutrality advocates have expressed concern that the potential exists for ISPs to use diversifying service requirements as cover for a deliberate strategy to favor their own content and to extort additional payments from users and content providers threatened with intentionally degraded service.
Many network neutrality advocates speak and write in apocalyptic terms about the impact of price and service discrimination and how it will eviscerate the Internet and enable carriers to delay or shut out competitors and ventures unwilling or unable to pay surcharges. The head of a consumer group claims that incumbent telephone and cable companies' can reshape the nation's digital destiny by branding the Internet and foreclosing much of its societal and cultural benefits. 15 On the other hand, opponents of network neutrality categorically reject as commercially infeasible any instance of unreasonable discrimination or service degradation.
Network neutrality opponents also note that ISPs typically qualify for a regulatory "safe harbor" 16 that largely insulates them from regulation, because they operate as value added, information service providers 17 and not telecommunications service providers. 18 While the latter group incur traditional common carrier, public utility responsibilities, including the duty not to discriminate, the former group enjoys quite limited government oversight in most nations.
Opponents of network neutrality see no actual or potential problems resulting from ISPs having freedom to discriminate and diversify service. Without such flexibility, opponents of network neutrality express concern whether ISPs will continue to risk investing the billions of dollars needed for construction of next generation network infrastructure.
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A.
Wireless Network Neutrality
The network neutrality debate has focused almost exclusively on Internet access via wireline carriers. Recently the issue of wireless Internet access has surfaced in light of the growing importance of wireless services and consumer frustration with carrier tactics that disable handset functions and block access to competing services. 20 While wireless handsets generally can access Internet services, most carriers attempt to favor content they provide or secure from
third parties under what critics deem a "walled garden" strategy: deliberate efforts to lock consumers into accessing and paying for favored content and services.
Just about every nation in the world has established policies that mandate the right of consumers to own their own telephone and to use any device to access any carrier, service or function provided it does not cause technical harm to the telecommunications network. 21 Once regulators unbundled telecommunications service from devices that access network services, a robustly competitive market evolved for both devices and services. Remarkably wireless carriers in many nations, including the United States, have managed to avoid having to comply with this open network concept. Even though consumers own their wireless handset, the carrier providing service will operate only with specific types of handsets programmed only to work with one carrier's network. Carriers justify this lock in and high fees for early termination of service, because the carriers sell wireless handsets at subsidized rates-sometimes "free"-based on a two year subscription term. Of course the value of a two year lock in period offsets the handset subsidy, particularly in light of next generation wireless networks that will offer many services in addition to voice communications. In the United States wireless carriers and their "big box"
retail store partners sell more than 60% of all wireless handsets, 22 typically when a subscriber commences service or renews a subscription. No market for used handsets has evolved, because wireless carriers do not offer lower service rates for subscribers who do not need or want a subsidized handset.
Wireless network neutrality would require carriers to stop blocking the use of non-carrier affiliated handsets and locking handsets so that they work only on a single carrier network.
More broadly wireless network neutrality would prevent wireless carriers from preventing subscribers from using their handsets to access the content, services, and software applications of 
2) Reimposition of Common Carrier Responsibilities
Opponents of network neutrality claim that it would impose common carrier regulatory burdens on ISPs that have avoided such burdens, or have been able to secure a reclassification of services to avoid such responsibilities. In the United States Internet access, provided via DSL, 40 cable television plant, 41 power lines 42 and wireless networks, 43 constitute information services, largely exempt from regulation. Such re-regulation would impose cost, contain ISP flexibility and run counter to deregulatory initiatives.
Network neutrality advocates claim that requirements would not prove costly, because they would prohibit discriminatory actions rather than require costly, affirmative efforts to promote fairness. Opponents to network neutrality also imply that network neutrality requirements constitute a "confiscatory" and unlawful "taking" of their property. 44 Having invested in next generation infrastructure at significant expense both incumbent telephone and cable television operators expect to have nearly complete freedom from telecommunications service regulation. Additionally ISPs argue that Internet access has already become a robustly competitive market that can self-regulate.
B. Calibrating Carrier Rights and Responsibilities
Common carriers historically incur both responsibilities and special opportunities, e.g., rights of way access to federal, state, municipal and private property for little if any payment. 45 So too have the telephone and cable television companies that now complain that regulation confiscates their property. It comes across as disingenuous for both telephone and cable television companies to rationalize the right to extend legacy privileges acquired during their regulated years, to convergent ICE services, many or all of which appear to qualify for the information service safe harbor.
Currently cable television operators and telephone companies can leverage preexisting rights or way or secure new rights of way based on their former, or existing, but possibly now temporary, regulated status. There appears to be no distinction in terms of the scope of rights of way access available to carriers operating in their legacy, regulated mode and the very same carriers providing a larger array of services, some or all of which falling outside legacy regulators' jurisdiction. 46 For example, cable television operators regularly install equipment, including large above ground pedestals, without any payment to the property owner, so that the operators can offer triple play services regardless of whether the land owner wants these new services and without regard to the limited scope of services the carrier first offered as the basis for securing the rights of way initially. Similarly telephone companies continue to install new or replacement lines on private property without having to pay land owners, based on preexisting rights of way granted to the companies in their capacity as telecommunications service providers.
For so long as incumbent carriers continue to exploit the privileges conferred upon them in their capacity as regulated operators, these carriers should continue to accept limited quasicommon carrier responsibilities. For example, the broadcast television channel "must carry" 
A. Justified Apprehension
Network neutrality advocates primarily have only anecdotal information of intentional efforts to delay, block and drop packets. 49 In the United States, the FCC has intervened in only one instance involving a telephone company's refusal to terminate VoIP traffic. 50 The ISPs' incentive and apparent desire to differentiate service, the costly and widespread opposition to network neutrality and the provocative assertions of incumbent carrier senior managers point to a keen interest in pursuing network access tiering. The often cited Madison River case may offer little evidence that Internet content and service providers regularly risk unfair price and quality of service discrimination, or worst yet absolute blockage. However it does support apprehension that an enforcement mechanism does not exist when an ISP, and not a telephone company common carrier, engages in unreasonable discrimination, or absolute blockage. The FCC could threaten an investigation with the prospect of enforcement sanction only because the offending traffic blocker had an affirmative duty to accept traffic and deliver it to the final destination.
Until such time as the first and last kilometer of broadband access becomes robustly competitive customers will have as few as one or two carriers available for broadband access to content. 51 Under these conditions a decision by DSL and cable modem service providers to block certain types of traffic, or to degrade the traffic of unaffiliated or non-preferred content providers would have an immediate, identifiable and adverse impact on the public interest.
Under such circumstances regulatory oversight remains necessary, because the level of marketplace competition may not prevent bottleneck abuse and price squeezing behavior by ISPs.
B. Unjustified Apprehension
Network neutrality advocates fear that the next generation Internet will contain so much bias and preferential treatment as to jeopardize the fundamental end-to-end connectivity that has contributed to success. This "curtains for the Internet" perspective overstates the potential harm from access tiering, by unlawful, anticompetitive practices, for several reasons. ISPs may want to squeeze out additional revenues and may resort to heavy handed, extortionate tactics, but surely they would stop when such strategies are publicly disclosed by the news media possibly triggering closer scruinty of such tactics by legislative, regulatory and judicial authorities. 53 and its possibly introduction of a wireless handset.
But even if network neutrality becomes codified into law or regulation, network neutrality advocates have to accept that the next generation Internet will contain more bias, delivery options and service diversification than previously available. Advocates for network neutrality need to accept that customer and access tiering constitutes a predictable, and not always lamentable, product of a maturing marketplace.
As networks evolve and the technologies used become more diverse and mature, network operators have available the resources to recalibrate their pricing structure and to diversify services. ISPs have far greater ability to meter and examine Internet traffic. They want to exploit technological opportunities to "sniff" traffic packets 54 and to prioritize them 55 based on payments received, but they do not want to relinquish their exemption from regulation and liability for carrying harmful content.
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In light of the marketing tactics used to entice initial subscriptions most Internet users expect access to a lot of free content, on an "all you can eat," unmetered basis, 57 at a low fixed price with delivery speeds progressively increasing without a higher charge. The Internet's value proposition has increased over the years as consumers tap into increasingly diverse sites, now offering material that requires a network capable of delivering a broadband bitstream in real time. The power users of the Internet, spammers, gamers, peer-to-peer file sharers and full motion video watchers have become quasi-free riders in light of their ability to pay the same price as lower volume users, while forcing ISPs at both the end user link and farther upstream, to upgrade their networks while maintaining the same subscription rate.
III. The Resolution
Legislation could solve the network neutrality debate by providing principles for which regulatory agencies would have express legal authority to enforce. Additionally legislation could expressly authorize traffic reporting requirements on ISPs and the power of the National Regulatory Authorities ("NRAs") to investigate and remedy instances where dropped bits did not result from actual congestion. In light of the controversy surrounding this issue, the lack of consensus and well funded policy expressions, legislatures may not remedy the problem in a timely manner. 58 Absent legislation the stakeholders will have to take affirmative steps on their own toward resolution.
One example of dispute resolution among stakeholders occurred when AT&T unilaterally made some network neutrality commitments, albeit to secure approval of its merger with BellSouth. 59 AT&T has provided a document that, reluctantly perhaps, acknowledges that network neutrality is a concept that parties can convert into actual practices and service commitments.
The AT&T network neutrality commitments contain a time limited agreement to comply with a previous FCC statement of principles that articulate a baseline code of conduct for ISPs.
In a non-binding, non-compulsory Policy Statement the FCC articulated four "principles":
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice;
(2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement;
(3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. AT&T also committed to maintain the same number and types of existing peering agreements and for two years from the closing date of the merger, or the effective date of any legislation enacted by Congress subsequent to the merger closing, "to maintain a neutral network and neutral routing in its wireline broadband Internet access service . . . from the network side of the customer premise equipment up to and including the Internet Exchange Point closest to the customer's premise." 61 AT&T expressly reserved the right to tier service upstream and exempted its enterprise managed IP services and IPTV services from any network neutrality commitment, two loopholes that will grow in significance as AT&T migrates from copper-based transitional DSL broadband service to fiber optic networks ostensibly installed primarily to provide IPTV. capability for determining when an ISP has artificially created congestion as a ruse for degrading service to non-premium paying content providers and retail customers. Likewise such data could corroborate an ISP's assertion that it did nothing to degrade overall service, or target specific bitstreams for inferior service.
IV. Conclusion
The network neutrality debate highlights a particularly contentious time in ICE policy making. Stakeholders appear to have little inclination to find a middle ground, and decision makers appear to have even less. Policy making has become predominated by sponsored research, politics, campaign contributions and rhetoric. In light of an apparent disinterest for the facts, it comes as no surprise that the network neutrality debate highlights opposing perceptions about the impact from changes in the next generation Internet. Regrettably no unbiased fact finding appears readily available, because the issue has triggered intense lobbying and the use of hyperbole.
Network neutrality opponents have overstated the case that competition would remedy any and all instances of illegal network bias. A fully self-regulating Internet marketplace does not exist, nor can one confidently assert that the Internet marketplace would remedy all attempts at unreasonable network bias. On the other hand the Internet has not failed to function when network operators and content providers cut exclusive and preferential deals, or when network providers offer better than best efforts routing.
For better or worst the next generation Internet will adopt many of the biased networking characteristics of current vintage cable television and third generation cellular telephony. Cable television operators enjoy substantial freedom to cut special content delivery deals, but lawful "must carry" obligations impose affirmative carriage duties, notwithstanding cable operators' non-common carrier status. Commercial mobile radio service providers retain the common carrier, telecommunications service provider status, yet they can use new broadband carriage capabilities to deliver a biased, walled garden access to video and Internet content.
Regulators should agree to examine allegations of network bias and evaluate the complaint from a public interest template that considers whether discrimination constitutes an unfair trade practice, or a reasonable attempt at diversifying and proliferating information services. "Rather than 'broadcasting' a constant stream of all available programs, as cable does and Verizon plans to do, IPTV stores a potentially unlimited number of programs on a central server, which users then call up on demand. SBC will not replace the copper lines that currently run into customer premises. Instead, to make sure there is sufficient bandwidth between the neighborhood node where the optical fiber terminates and the household premise, it will upgrade the DSL equipment currently at those nodes and in households with VDSL technology. At the household, the viewer will use the IP technology to send a signal to the SBC end-office to send a particular channel or video on demand selection. That signal will be sent over the same bandwidth used for data and VoIP service. In SBC's system, a single customer line will have enough bandwidth to support up to four active television sets per household at a time, or up to two HDTV channels at a time. "The Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks that communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately more than 100 million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with the development of TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following characteristics or parameters:1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own specific environment and user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to connect to other parts of the Internet. Communications are not directed in a unilateral fashion. Rather, communications are routed throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis in which some packets of information may go through one series of computer networks and other packets of information go through a different permutation or combination of computer networks, with all of these information packets eventually arriving at their intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect the various networks; these boxes are called 'gateways' and 'routers.' The gateways and routers do not retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets being transmitted. Caching refers to intermediate and temporary storage of data. "Google makes and analyzes a copy of each Web page that it finds, and stores the HTML code from those pages in a temporary repository called a cache." Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a "safe harbor" exemption from liability for making cached copies of copyrighted works).
END NOTES
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"A packet sniffer (also known as a network analyzer or protocol analyzer or, for particular types of networks, an Ethernet sniffer or wireless sniffer) is computer software or computer hardware that can intercept and log traffic passing over a digital network or part of a network. As data streams travel back and forth over the network, the sniffer captures each packet and eventually decodes and analyzes its content according to the appropriate RFC or other specifications." Wikipedia, Packet sniffer; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_sniffer. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provider users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks. In the United States, information service providers generate "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service. " 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) . ISPs fit within the information service provider classification thereby exempting them from telecommunications service provider regulation. The FCC considers the two classifications mutually exclusive. " [T] 420 (1968 420 ( ), recon. denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968 Telerent Leasing Corp. et al., 45 FCC 2d 204 (1974) 
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"Few doubt that the future of telecommunications will rely mostly on broadband and wireless technologies. Wireless and broadband technologies are transforming the telecommunications market, offering users ubiquitous access to voice, data, and internet services. The number of mobile subscribers has already surpassed that of end-user switched access lines served by local exchange carriers." National Regulatory Research Institute, Methods for Analyzing the Effects of Broadband and Wireless Services on Competition in Local Telephony, Project Announcement; available at: http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/currentprojects/telecommunications/methods-for-analyzing-the-impact-of-broadband-and-wirelessservices-on/.
27 "The idea of a computer network intended to allow general communication between users of various computers has developed through a large number of stages. The melting pot of developments brought together the network of networks that we know as the Internet." Wikipedia, History of the Internet; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Internet.
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"TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a 'first come, first served' and 'best efforts' basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applications that are less tolerant of variations in throughput rates, such as streaming media and VoIP, and is biased against network-based security features that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and spam." Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (Fall, 2005) . "Tier 1 networks typically seek to protect their relatively rare status by preventing new networks from becoming Tier 1's and thus potentially competing. The networks often accomplish this by setting "peering requirements" which are intended to be too high for new networks to meet. Some experts in the field of Internet interconnections have compared the collective behaviors and motivations of Tier 1 networks to those of a cartel, in that they attempt to reduce competition in Internet bandwidth pricing through tacit collusion, and attempt to restrict the admission of new members. When one Tier 1 is perceived to be "cheating" the cartel by selling transit for too low a price, or by "dumping" too much outbound heavy bandwidth (which is significantly easier to deliver for the sending network than the receiving network), other members may move to de-peer that network." Wikipedia, Tier1 network, Politics; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_carrier.
31
Internet transiting refers to a traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees to accept traffic for onward routing for compensation. Transiting involves a settlement and payment of funds because one ISP requires access to the links, subscribers and content available via another ISP's network and its peering arrangements. "Transit is the business relationship whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to all destinations in its routing 
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"Two-sided (or more generally multi-sided1) markets are roughly defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides "on board" by appropriately charging each side. That is, platforms court each side while attempting to make, or at least not lose, money overall." Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview (March 12, 2004 ); available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/rochet_tirole.pdf.
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Cable modems provide Internet access using a small portion of the bandwidth available from cable television networks. "Cable operators have invested in major improvements or system upgrades to provide cable modem service. The typical upgrade employs a hybrid fibercoaxial (HFC) architecture. Most HFC systems utilize fiber between the cable operators' offices (the headend) and the neighborhood "nodes.' Between the nodes and the individual end-user homes, signals travel over traditional coaxial cable infrastructure. Part of the cable system, typically a 6 MHz channel, is dedicated to cable modem service. At each subscriber's home or office, a splitter and a high-speed cable modem are installed. The splitter separates signals and sends them to different cables going to the subscriber's television and computer. The cable that goes to the computer connects with a high-speed cable modem and an Ethernet card that are attached to the computer. This modem and card enable the cable system to communicate with the subscriber's computer, and vice versa." Inquiry Concerning The Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 , 17 FCC Rcd. 2844 , 2915 . 40 The Supreme Court has endorsed this leveraging of access rights. In National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Inc., v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002) the Supreme ruled that cable television companies have the same legal right to access and attach wires to poles owned and operated by other utilities regardless of which such pole attachments are used to provide regulated video or unregulated broadband services. 47 See 230-246 (2005-06) . 48 See, e.g., Associated Press, Comcast Admits Delaying Some Traffic (Oct. 23, 2007) , available at: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/technology/AP-Comcast-DataDiscrimination.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (a major cable television and Internet access provider admitted to degrading peer-to-peer network traffic ostensibly to better "shape" and manage traffic). 49 See, e.g., SavetheInternet.com, How does this threat to Internet freedom affect you? available at: http://www.savetheinternet.com/=threat (claiming blocked access by Canadian incumbent telephone company to a Web site sympathetic to the Telecommunications Workers Union during a contentious labor dispute; intentional degradation of competing VoIP service
